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Financing Sustainability: The New Transnational Governance of 
Socially Responsible Investment 
 
Benjamin J. Richardson 
 
I. GOVER N ING THE SO CI A LLY RE SP ONSI BLE IN VE ST M ENT (SR I) MAR K ET 
1. Introduction 
The surge in transnational investment in recent decades presents new and unusual 
challenges to international environmental law. Financial markets are not a collection of 
disparate national financial systems. Rather, they function increasingly within a single 
global marketplace.1 At the same time, financial regulation remains a product of national 
laws, mostly designed to facilitate, rather than hinder, global financial flows.2 Apart 
from the European Union (EU), inter-governmental supervision of these Flows is largely 
at a nascent stage of evolution.3 International law typically speaks to the behaviour and 
responsibilities of states and not to institutional investors and other corporate entities. The 
result is a transnational financial system ‘in which money traverses national capital markets 
with dramatic speed and callous scrutiny, bringing with it both the ability to enhance local 
economic opportunities or break an economy at its very core.’4 
Transnational financial markets are also significant to the environment because 
they transform money by scale, time, and location into an instrument of 
development. One possible reaction to social and environmental impacts of capital 
markets is the emergence of new standards for SRI. In the absence of formal 
international law outlining environmental rules, a variety of voluntary and other 
soft law mechanisms have arisen to encourage banks and other financiers to invest 
 ethically and sustainably. These mechanisms   include   the   United   Nations   
Principles   of   Responsible Investment, the Equator Principles, and other like 
standards.5 
SRI, which is also known as ethical investment or sustainable finance, depending on its 
focus, considers social, environmental, and ethical consequences in the provision of capital to 
companies. By targeting entities that financially sponsor investments, in comparison to front-
line companies that extract, consume, and pollute, SRI promises a novel way to achieve 
sustainability. Sustainability, as a higher-order social goal, concerns the integrity of natural 
systems (global climate, evolutionary viability of ecosystems, and other vital life-support 
services) and societal and economic issues (health, human rights, poverty, and so on).6 
Responsible investment challenges the traditional conceptualization of financial markets 
as essentially amoral and driven only by economic rationality. Beginning in the 1700s, 
religious groups led by the Quakers began to eschew investments in sin businesses connected 
to the slave trade or the production of intoxicants. SRI has since emerged from its ecclesiastical 
foundations into a broader coalition for socially and environmentally responsible financing.7 
Among its adherents are pension plans interested in sustainable, long-term investment, 
specialist ethical mutual funds, and banks that evaluate environmental risks as part of their 
lending policies.8 A broad distinction has evolved in SRI between ethical investment, which is 
driven by moral imperatives and often a desire for political change, and a less controversial 
approach that accommodates social and environmental issues when they present ‘material’ 
financial risks and opportunities for investors. 
Though growing quickly, the SRI sector in its entirety, nonetheless, has captured 
only a small market. It likely averages just 3–10 per cent of the investment market 
in major economies.9 SRI’s clout is thus limited by its market penetration, but, if it could 
become more mainstream, financial markets could arguably contribute significantly 
to sustainability. Before this shift can happen, however, reform of financial 
markets is necessary to remove various market and institutional barriers to SRI, 
 such as incentives for short-term financial returns and investors’ ignorance of the 
financial impact of corporate environmental performance. 
The time has long passed for environmental regulation to target the financial sector. The 
domain of environmental law is not intuitively associated with banks, pension funds, and 
other financiers since law makers typically only connect environmental problems directly 
to companies that extract, consume, and pollute. Yet, corporate financiers should be seen as 
the economy’s ‘unseen polluters,’ as they finance activities habitually attributed solely to their 
borrowers and investees. Financial sponsorship of environmentally harmful development 
should also place corporate financiers within the cupola of responsibility. The biggest 
environmental impact of financiers is not their own, direct ecological footprint but, rather, 
their indirect impacts from the allocation of capital to other businesses.10 Corporations are 
rarely entirely financially self-sufficient and must turn to capital markets for new 
investment to fuel growth.11 Financiers, in turn, can gain influence through their ownership 
stakes in companies.12 Economic growth and its environmental impacts are thus intertwined 
with financial sector decisions. 
A proliferation of institutions and new methods for governance of the sector has 
contributed to the growth of SRI. These mainly non-state forms of governance are often 
organized transnationally and furnish both substantive standards for environmentally 
responsible finance and procedures for more transparent, accountable decisions.13 This 
ensemble of multilayered and fragmented regulation, with little government input, aims to 
promote the SRI market.14 While the use of these mechanisms is mostly voluntary, for 
some investors the question is no longer whether to use these mechanisms but which ones to 
apply and how. 
This article categorizes these mechanisms of SRI governance into four main types. 
First, normative  frameworks  provide  governance  through the enunciation of 
substantive principles and guidance on desirable performance. Normative 
guidelines include the Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions and the 
 UN Principles of Responsible Investment.15 Second, process standards that enable the 
assessment, verification, and communication of performance are another form of 
governance. These standards include the Equator Principles and the Global 
Reporting Initiative.16 Third, management systems, such as the International 
Organization of Standardization’s ISO 14001 regime, provide integrated or issue 
specific frameworks to guide the ongoing management of environmental and social 
impacts. Fourth, comparative evaluation mechanisms exist, whereby external entities 
evaluate and rank corporate performance for the SRI industry. These rating 
mechanisms include SRI stock market indexes, such as the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Group Indexes, and SRI think tanks, such as the Social Investment Forum. 
These governance mechanisms operate in multi-jurisdictional contexts and financial 
institutions that function in global markets.17 Technological advances and market 
deregulation have accelerated the geographical mobility of capital in its search for the 
highest returns.18 The globalization of financial services reduces the power of states 
individually to regulate financial markets.19 National regulators may also face capacity and 
information deficits in supervising enterprises engaged in complex trans-border 
commerce. Transnational collaboration is also necessary to prevent responsible financiers 
from suffering competitive disadvantages. 
The rest of this article explains what these major SRI governance mechanisms 
demand of financial institutions, assesses their implementation, and makes some 
observations about the adequacy of this form of governance for SRI. While 
multilateral development banks (MDBs), bilateral foreign aid, and export credit 
agencies still play a key role, private financiers have become more significant and 
visible. The article does not discuss intergovernmental mechanisms or public 
financing. These systems raise separate policy issues, which are discussed in 
other literature.20  Nor does it canvass national level reforms for  SRI.21  The next 
 section considers 
the theoretical context within which the voluntary-based regulation for SRI has 
emerged, before canvassing the actual mechanisms of SRI governance. 
2. Regulatory Techniques for Governing the Financial Sector  
Governance is the decision-making process by which society and organizations are controlled 
and coordinated.22 Governance is commonly associated with official regulation, whereby 
government imposes obligations or constraints on private sector behaviour.23  
Concomitantly, in an international context, governance traditionally requires inter-
governmental cooperation through treaties and other agreements. The weakness of these 
understandings of governance based on agency or institution is that a government decision can 
become labelled as being regulatory regardless of whether or not it actually discharges 
regulatory functions. Conversely, private sector actions can be more influential in controlling 
corporate behaviour. 
Contemporary governance is increasingly dependent on collaboration between the 
state and non-governmental market and civil societal interests.24 In addition, mechanisms 
of governance are becoming less coercive and are including more informational and 
incentive mechanisms.25 Legal pluralism theory has helped scholars to conceive of 
regulation as something more than just the activities of the state.26 Private codes of conduct 
and other forms of market-generated accountability programmes are part of these 
heterogeneous or pluralistic systems of modern governance.27 In international law, these 
initiatives may be known as ‘soft law.’28 Market-based ordering governance may match the 
effectiveness of state regulation, particularly when firms are concerned about their 
reputations and where it helps forestall ‘the less palatable alternative’ of official regulation.29 
These changes in governance resonate with ‘reflexive’ forms of regulation. As a 
result of the significant functional differentiation in our social systems,  
mechanisms  promoting  corporate  social  responsibility  should arguably operate at 
the level of specific subsystems (for example, the market).30 Rejecting regulatory 
compulsion, Gunther Teubner reasons that legal systems could best change 
 corporate behaviour by targeting companies’ internal organizational structures. He 
explains: ‘[T]he role of law then is not the external control of the firm’s conduct, 
but the external mobilisation of internal self-control resources.’31 In contrast to the 
supposedly heavy hand of command regulation, which seeks to control behaviour 
directly, a system based on reflexive law ‘attempts to create incentives and 
procedures that induce entities to act in certain ways and to engage in internal 
reflection about what form that behaviour should take . . . the state sets goals, but shares 
more of the responsibility for achieving them with regulated entities.’32 For instance, 
requirements to disclose, inform, and consult with stakeholders should help make 
the practices of companies isomorphic with external public policy demands. More 
understanding of the connections between environmental risk and financial risk may 
ensue from the reflexive governance of the financial sector, especially if 
environmental concerns are enunciated in a way that is comprehensible to financial 
decision makers.33 
Reflexive regulation is not just a matter of redesigning government legislation or 
international treaties. It can also arise through nongovernmental sources of governance, 
such as voluntary codes of conduct developed by businesses. As the next section 
explores, voluntary codes may promote reflection and learning and, thereby, encourage a 
positive cultural change in the management of subject business.34 They may also, however, 
be an excuse to merely tinker marginally with current unsustainable habits and disguise the 
continuation of business as usual. 
3. Voluntary Standards for SRI 
Without sufficient international or national regulation to  promote  SRI, much will 
hinge upon the willingness of financiers to voluntarily promote environmentally 
sustainable finance. The voluntary approach, which  is often described as corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) or business self-regulation, is apparently thriving.35 The 
 expansion of global commerce and finance has fuelled debate over the appropriate and 
legitimate role of the private sector in responding to environmental and social 
problems. Industry increasingly participates in discussions concerning social equity 
and environmental protection, as both a cause and solution to problems. The 
concomitant reframing of private actors, especially transnational companies 
(TNCs), from amoral profit-seeking enterprises to ‘corporate citizens,’ has 
heightened public expectations of socially responsible behaviour.36 
In practice, a company’s adherence to a voluntary code or other mechanism is seldom if 
ever purely ‘voluntary,’ in the sense of doing something autonomously and freely for its own 
sake. Sometimes, it feels external pressure to act more responsibly.37 Voluntary commitments 
may also be rewarding, providing access to technical assistance, financial aid, professional 
certification, and public acknowledgement.38 Indeed, ecological modernization theorists 
sanguinely believe that, through a framework of industrial modernity, environmental 
protection and economic development can be mutually supportive.39 Environmental care, 
in this vein, can facilitate efficiency and improve productivity through a less wasteful use of 
resources.40 Pressure on financial institutions to heed voluntary standards may arise from 
a threat of mandatory regulation, the prospect of adverse publicity, the need to distinguish 
themselves in a competitive market, and demands from a local community, customers, or 
business associations.41 
Whatever the motivations, voluntary standards  are ‘voluntary’ to the extent that 
authorities do not formally enforce their  adoption.  Further, while adoption of 
voluntary codes is not legally obligatory, it may have legal consequences once they 
are adopted.42 An industry code or standard may generate legal consequences 
through subsequent contracts among participating firms (for example, a loan 
covenant between a lender and borrower). 
Corporate responses to voluntary standards vary considerably.43 Generally, at one extreme, 
companies that actively address environmental issues view escalating pressures on their 
 business reputation as a strategic opportunity to enhance business value by adopting new 
practices beyond the requirements of environmental law. Alternatively, some firms react 
negatively, perceiving them as a source of financial risk and liability, which may diminish 
shareholder value. 
As such, the composition of actors and interests that make up the institutional milieu of a 
particular firm and the nature of its stakeholder relationships determine how a firm 
conceptualizes challenges to its corporate reputation. For example, a project-lending bank 
closely monitored by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may face relatively high 
reputational risks from irresponsible financing decisions. Conversely, a pension fund that is 
not directly involved in development financing decisions and is insulated from normal 
market pressures, may face less societal scrutiny. Therefore, investing in companies with 
unsound environmental practices is less risky. 
Some scholars and policy makers remain sceptical that voluntary mechanisms provide a 
viable means of public policy and doubt their legitimacy as instruments of environmental or 
social regulation.44 This criticism has some merit. Various empirical research casts doubt 
on the effectiveness of voluntary measures to significantly mitigate corporate 
environmental harm.45 For instance, the European Commission recently made emissions 
requirements on car manufacturers mandatory because the automobile industry had failed to 
meet its own voluntary code of 1998.46 Ideally, voluntary mechanisms create an institutional 
context whereby civil society can directly engage with companies and obtain information 
about their practices. More commonly, however, voluntary  measures  lack  transparency and 
accountability.47 In fact, they may pre-empt regulation and thereby forestall meaningful 
change.48 In addition, negotiation and development of voluntary measures carry transaction 
costs. Further, there is the perennial danger of free riding, whereby non-participants exploit 
the benefits of a voluntary regime without contributing to its costs.49 For example, although 
many financial institutions have declined to support China’s Three Gorges Dam project or 
Peru’s Camisea natural gas project, some banks did not share these negative views and 
stepped in to provide the necessary loans.50 Overall, without careful design and enforcement, 
 voluntary measures may do little to promote sustainability and become a reprehensible 
means to perpetuate business as usual. 
I .  NOR M AT I V E  FR A M EWOR KS  
1. Introduction 
A common governance mechanism for SRI involves codes that are developed by third 
parties, which organizations are invited to implement. Third parties may include 
environmental NGOs, industry associations, international technical standardization 
bodies, or an inter-governmental entity such as the United Nations.51 The international codes 
most relevant to SRI are enumerated in Table 1.52 
 
 
Apart  from  the  UN  norms,  none  of  these  codes  are  formal  inter-governmental 
initiatives.53 For the two UN Environment Programme (UNEP)-sponsored codes,  UNEP 
simply coordinates and facilitates the process for businesses and other non-governmental 
participants. The following discussion covers only a representative sampling of these 
codes, namely those governance approaches that address  SRI  directly  rather than 
corporate behaviour generally or that have garnered the most debate in the SRI 
community. Consequently, this article does not consider the UN Global  Compact,54  
CERES  Principles,55  London  Principles,56  or the Sullivan Principles.57 
 2. UNEP’s Finance Initiative (UNEPFI) 
The first transnational code specifically for SRI was developed by UNEPFI.58 
The finance initiative has become a catalyst for bringing environmental issues to 
the attention of global financial markets. Established in 1991 and headquartered 
in Geneva, UNEPFI is a public-private partnership.59 It promotes education and 
research on SRI and the design of SRI management tools.60 In 1992 it released its 
first code, the Statement by Banks on Environment and Sustainable Development, 
for banks to manage environmental risks.61 In 1995 UNEPFI sponsored a similar 
statement for the insurance industry.62 In May 1997 UNEPFI issued a more general, 
umbrella code for all financiers—the Statement by Financial Institutions on the 
Environment and Sustainable Development.63 Although the statement is short on 
measurable, concrete specifics, it has relatively ambitious standards for 
environmental risk assessment and public reporting on environmental policy and 
practice.64 Commendably, the statement primarily targets the influence that 
financiers have over the environmental performance of their borrowers and clients. 
Over 200 institutions have signed UNEPFI’s 1997 statement, including commercial 
banks, venture capitalists, and asset managers.65 
Despite its global reach, the impact of UNEPFI has probably been modest. The lack of 
transparency that characterizes the operation of most financiers hinders an assessment of the 
extent to which signatories actually meet their commitments. A European survey in 1998 to 
monitor implementation of the UNEPFI statements found that the majority of the sixty-three 
respondents had a dedicated environmental unit and specific environmental policies and 
procedures for corporate credit and project finance. Environmental policies and procedures 
were relatively uncommon in the investment banking and insurance sectors.66 
Prior to 2000, UNEPFI was a tiny operation employing just two core staff. Apart from 
its sustainable finance statements, UNEPFI served mainly to network environmental risk 
experts in the financial sector.67 By 2006 UNEPFI had expanded to at least fifteen staff 
 and taken on more activities. UNEPFI signatories may participate in training and 
workshops, taskforce meetings, global roundtables, and themed conferences sponsored by 
the initiatives.68 UNEPFI facilitates various working groups to target specific issues69 and 
regional taskforces for banks and insurance companies in North America, Asia-Pacific, and 
other regions.70 All of these efforts essentially focus on creative ways to improve appreciation 
of the links between finance and sustainability. 
3. UN Principles of Responsible Investment (UNPRI) 
The UNPRI, which was developed under the auspices of UNEP, principally address 
institutional investors. They were adopted because the UNEPFI statements, which 
focus on banks and insurers, were not considered by the SRI community to provide 
an adequate framework for responsible financing in the institutional sector.71 The 
UNPRI were drafted by a group of invited investment professionals mainly from the 
pension fund sector and were supported by a seventy-person multi-stakeholder 
collection of experts from the investment industry, inter-governmental, and 
governmental organizations, civil society, and academia. Friends of the Earth (FOE) 
and the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) were among the NGOs involved. 
UNEP was not formally involved in the drafting of the UNPRI because its 
involvement would have required the principles to be developed through a formal 
intergovernmental process, which would have been too slow and politically 
complicated.72 Therefore, the UNPRI became an industry-led initiative, in which 
UNEP simply coordinated and facilitated the negotiations. 
The UNPRI is a brief document of six core principles, each of which is illustrated by 
thirty-five ‘possible actions’ to achieve them. The principles are: 
o We will incorporate environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) 
issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes. 
o We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership 
policies and practices. 
 o We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which 
we invest. 
o We  will  promote  acceptance  and  implementation  of  the  principles within 
the investment industry. 
o We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the 
principles. 
o We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing the 
principles.73 
The accompanying ‘possible actions’ amount to a ‘best practice’ guide. Concerning the 
second principle, for instance, the possible actions specified to achieve active ownership 
include ‘exercising voting rights,’ ‘developing an engagement capability,’ and ‘filing 
shareholder resolutions consistent with long-term ESG considerations.’ The principles are 
intended for signature by three types of institutions: asset owners (for example, pension funds), 
investment managers (intermediaries who manage funds on behalf of others), and professional 
service partners (for example, stock exchanges). As of late 2007, approximately 2000 
institutions had signed the principles, holding about US $10 trillion in assets under 
management.74 
Will the UNPRI lead to a fundamental transformation in investor behaviour towards 
sustainability? According to the principles’ sponsor, [i]mplementing the Principles will 
lead to a more complete understanding of a range of material issues, and this should ultimately 
result in increased returns and lower risk. Signatories will be part of a network, which creates 
opportunities to pool resources, lowering the costs of research and active ownership practices. The 
Principles also allow investors to work together to address a range of systemic problems that, if 
remedied, may then lead to more stable, accountable and pro5table market conditions overall.75 
As a normative framework for SRI, the principles have some notable shortcomings. For the 
first principle, among the list of possible actions, investors are not expected to actually 
incorporate ESG factors into their portfolio choices, such as to apply ethical asset selection 
screens. The second principle on active ownership focuses on participation in investee 
 companies while incongruously  ignoring the imperative  of democratizing decision 
making within financial institutions themselves. 
Unlike some other voluntary codes and standards, the UNPRI do not provide for any 
independent audit or verification mechanism to assess the quality of signatories’ 
implementation. Nor is there any upfront requirement for a prospective signatory to 
demonstrate any particular SRI performance standards, thereby limiting their 
effectiveness. To sign up, an investor need only e-mail an expression of interest, followed 
by a statement of commitment  ratified by their  governing investor board.  The UNPRI 
website explains: 
There are no legal or regulatory sanctions associated with the Principles. They are designed to be 
voluntary and aspirational. There may be reputational risks associated with signing up and then 
failing to take any action, but the commitments are, for most signatories, a work in progress and a 
direction to head in rather than a prescriptive checklist with which to comply . . . As the project 
develops over time, the Board will consider how signatories can monitor and report on progress.76 
However, rigorous oversight from the UNPRI governing board cannot be expected. The 
governing board, a majority of whom are asset owners, are elected from within the asset 
owner category of signatories. Yet, despite these shortcomings, the UNPRI have been 
generally well received by the finance sector and civil societal institutions.77 In recent 
years, many asset owners have signed up. Whether this enthusiasm will drive positive changes 
in their behaviour is yet to be determined. 
UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations Another 
international standard connected with the United Nations is the UN  Norms  on  
the  Responsibilities  of  Transnational  Corporations  and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms).78 They apply to a range of 
TNCs, including investment companies and other investment intermediaries. In 
contrast to other instruments discussed in this article, the UN Norms are intended 
to be legally binding if and when they are adopted by states. The UN Norms, 
which formalize the types of demands originally made by developing countries at 
 the UN Commission on Transnational Corporations in the 1970s, mainly address 
labour standards and consumer protection.79 They also contain several 
environmental provisions. They call upon TNCs to observe the precautionary 
principle and to act ‘in a manner contributing to the wider goal of sustainable 
development.’80 They go so far as to demand TNCs to respect a societal ‘right to a 
clean and healthy environment.’81 
The UN Norms contain several procedural requirements for their implementation.82 
While they accommodate a role for the state,83 the UN Norms expect TNCs to ‘adopt, 
disseminate and implement internal rules of operation’ and ‘to periodically report’84 on 
their progress ‘to all relevant stakeholders.’85 Importantly, TNCs are further compelled to 
‘apply and incorporate [the] Norms in their contracts or other arrangements and dealings’ 
with almost any and every party with whom they do business.86 Where their contracting 
partners violate these terms, TNCs are required to ‘cease doing business with them.’87 
Sanctions for non-compliance may include compensation that is determined by national 
and/or international courts to affected persons and other entities.88 With these requirements, 
the UN Norms seek in an unprecedented way to circumvent state authority and impose 
international legal obligations directly on TNCs. 
The UN Norms thus herald a radical departure from previous 
intergovernmental attempts to govern TNCs. Their most polarizing trait is 
their imposition of obligations directly on corporations, in addition to 
concomitant duties on states.89 This attribution attempts to overcome one of the 
main governance gaps concerning TNCs, namely the fact that due to their 
transnational nature, they often operate in a legal vacuum, particularly in states 
that are themselves deeply mired in environmental and human rights abuses. Yet it 
is an unorthodox approach in international law. Many companies and their 
associations, such as the International Chamber of Commerce, have criticized the 
UN Norms for shifting the obligation to protect human rights and the environment 
 from governments to private companies. 
These considerations have weighed on the UN Commission on Human Rights, which 
declined to endorse the UN Norms.90 A report by John Ruggie, UN special 
representative on human rights and business, was critical of the form and reach of the UN 
Norms and viewed the initiative as creating ‘confusion and doubt’ through ‘exaggerated 
legal claims and conceptual ambiguities.’91 Even though the United  Nations may never 
formally adopt the UN Norms, some SRI institutions are beginning to refer to them in their 
shareholder resolutions and proxy-voting guidelines.92 The Interfaith Center for Corporate 
Responsibility, for example, which coordinates SRI among religious investors, has endorsed 
the UN Norms.93 They would likely help bolster SRI by focusing on the environmental 
behaviour of companies and those that finance them. 
4. Collevecchio Declaration 
Civil societal groups that are critical of facile, business-friendly codes of conduct 
have offered financial institutions an alternative standard. In 2003 a coalition of 
NGOs drafted the Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions 
(Collevecchio Declaration),94 comprising six principles that stress accountability, 
transparency, and stakeholder rights. Since groups outside of the financial sector 
have prepared it, the Collevecchio Declaration presents itself as a more credible code. 
On the other hand, this design is also a disadvantage since the declaration has little 
buy-in from the financial sector. As of late 2007, approximately 100 organizations, 
mostly NGOs, have endorsed the declaration.95 Very few endorsements have come 
from financial institutions. 
The Collevecchio Declaration requires financiers’ commitment to sustainability, ‘no 
harm’ responsibility, accountability, transparency, and sustainable markets and 
governance. The declaration differs from other normative standards through its more 
rigorous and detailed requirements. 
The ‘commitment to sustainability’ principle obliges investors to expand their missions from 
 ones that prioritize pro5t maximization to a vision of social and environmental sustainability. A 
commitment to sustainability would require financial institutions to fully integrate the consideration 
of  ecological limits, social equity and economic justice into corporate strategies and core 
business areas (including credit, investing, underwriting, advising), to put sustainability objectives on 
an equal footing to shareholder maximization and client satisfaction, and to actively strive to 5nance 
transactions that promote sustainability. 
Concomitantly, the declaration emphasizes precaution and the avoidance of harm rather than 
merely the mitigation of impacts, as in some other codes. It also seeks to strengthen financiers’ 
accountability and transparency beyond the requirements of rival codes. On transparency, 
for instance, it advises financial institutions to be ‘responsive to stakeholder needs for 
specialized information’ and that ‘commercial confidentiality should not be used as an 
excuse to deny stakeholders information.’ 
The declaration’s accompanying implementation document usefully elaborates these 
principles and gives financiers specific guidance for promoting environmentally sound 
financing. For example, concerning the commitment to transparency, it provides: 
(a) Corporate Sustainability Reporting 
Financial institutions should publish annual sustainability reports according to an internationally 
recognized reporting format supported by civil society. Financial institutions should further include 
disclosure on the sustainability profile of the financial institution’s portfolio, a breakdown of core 
business activity by sector and region, and the implementation of the financial institution’s 
sustainability policies and objectives. 
For now, these and other Collevecchio standards are possibly too demanding for 
many banks and other financiers to accept. As the following section discusses, banks 
have favoured the Equator Principles to manage their social and environmental 
activities because this code was developed largely by the banking community itself 
and gives lenders greater leeway and discretion. 
1. Equator Principles 
II .  PRO C E S S STA N DA R DS 
A. Overview of the Standards 
 In the project finance market, the Equator Principles (EPs) provide lenders with a 
framework to consider social and environmental issues.96 Project finance means loans for 
specific projects such as highways, dams, factories, and other major economic investments 
that often have a substantial ecological footprint. Formulated primarily by the banking 
industry under the auspices of the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
the EPs target private, commercial lending in developing countries and emerging economies 
where environmental regulation may be tenuous. While the EPs are categorized in this 
article as being primarily process standards, they also include a normative framework 
through their incorporation of the IFC’s performance standards. 
The EPs arose from pressure from financial institutions such as the Calvert Group and Insight 
Investment, as well as from demands from NGOs including the WWF and the FOE.97 The 
financing of the Chad–Cameroon oil pipeline was the specific catalyst for such pressure.98 
Fearing a volley of criticism if they supported this controversial project or the risk that 
they would lose business to unscrupulous lenders if they insisted on strict environmental 
safeguards, a cohort of banks sought a new level playing field for responsible project 
financing. To boost the credibility of the proposed standards, the banks involved the IFC in 
the process. The IFC is the World Bank’s private-sector lending arm, with extensive hands-on 
experience with project finance, including the application of sustainability standards. 
The EPs were finalized in June 2003 and revised in April 2006.99 The EPs are not 
self-contained but incorporate reference to other standards, primarily the IFC’s 
environmental and social performance, which address, inter alia, social and 
environmental impact assessment (SEIA), natural resource conservation, indigenous 
peoples, involuntary resettlement, labour, and so on. The EPs apply to projects with 
a total capital cost of at least US $10 million (which was previously US $fi0 million). 
The revised principles extend to upgrades or expansions of existing projects where 
additional environmental or social impacts are significant. All signatories to the EPs 
pledge to provide loans only to borrowers who conform to the principles. 
 The EPs initially require lenders to rate projects that they plan to finance based on the 
magnitude of potential impacts and risks in accordance with the screening criteria of the 
IFC.100 These criteria categorize projects as A, B, or C (high, medium, and low), depending 
on the potential environmental and social impact of the project. For A and B projects, the 
borrower must undertake a SEIA based on IFC standards to address issues identified in the 
screening process. Project-financing banks must also prepare an action plan based on the 
conclusions of the SEIA.101 For category C projects, which are of lesser impact, no further 
assessment is required beyond the initial screening. 
For all category A and B projects, lenders must ensure that the borrower has consulted ‘in 
a structured and culturally appropriate manner.’102 The SEIA report and action plan must be 
publicly available in a local language for a reasonable period to allow for public comment. 
These documents are also subject to independent expert review.103 The borrower must also 
establish a ‘grievance mechanism’ to allow it to ‘receive and facilitate resolution of concerns 
and grievances about the project’s social and environmental performance raised by 
individuals or groups from among project-affected communities.’104 Prior to drawing on the 
loan, the borrower must covenant with the lender to (1) comply with the environmental 
management plan in the construction and operation of the project; (2) provide regular reports 
on compliance with the plan; and (3) where applicable, decommission facilities in accordance 
with an agreed plan.105 
 
B. Response of the Banking Community 
Given the banking community’s heavy involvement in the actual design of the EPs, 
it is not surprising that banks have generally welcomed the principles. As of June 
2007, approximately fifty banks and related financial institutions had pledged 
themselves to the principles, accounting for over 80 per cent of the global project 
financing market.106 Most of the signatories are North American or western European 
banks. A study by the British law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer concluded 
 that the EPs ‘impact on the financial market generally and their success in 
redefining banking considerations has been far greater than anyone could have 
predicted.’107 
The EPs have appealed to banks for several reasons, including the fact that they counter 
stakeholder and NGO activism, protect market share, maintain a level business playing 
field, incorporate voluntary standards, and minimize financial risks.108 For some lenders, 
subscription to the EPs offers public relations benefits to counter increasing NGO scrutiny of 
their environmental and social behaviour.109 For instance, following a 2005 shareholder 
proposal filed to the Bank of Montreal by the Ethical Funds Company, the resolution was 
withdrawn after the bank agreed to adhere to the EPs.110 Similarly, the Rainforest Action 
Network was particularly successful in its global finance campaign to get Citigroup, the 
world’s largest bank, to change its policies to avoid destructive investment in endangered 
ecosystems.111 
 
C. Implementation of the EPs 
The 2006 revisions to the EPs have improved their accountability, transparency, and 
enforceability, although not to the satisfaction of all critics.112 Significantly, a lender’s 
categorization of a project or the scope of an environmental impact assessment (EIA) or 
management plan cannot readily be challenged. The categorization of a project is crucial 
for it influences the types of environmental standards and procedures that would 
subsequently apply. Normally, environmental legislation would allow interested persons to 
review and challenge such a threshold decision. While affected groups may comment 
publicly on a SEIA or a proposed management plan, they do not have the legal rights to 
challenge such plans, since EPs are voluntary and therefore do not make this provision. 
Moreover, the language of the principles is vague. For example, the assessment of projects 
need only ‘refer to’ the IFC standards. 
The EPs, however, require the lender to appoint an independent environmental 
expert to monitor all category A projects and, ‘as appropriate,’ all  category  B  
 projects.113   Further,  ‘at  least  annually,’  the  lender  must disclose to the public its 
‘implementation processes and experience, taking into account appropriate 
confidentiality considerations.’114 While these measures should help to illuminate 
lenders’ implementation efforts, the EPs lack a supporting secretariat to 
coordinate oversight. BankTrack, an umbrella organization of NGOs, has 
relentlessly criticized the Equator banks. Its 2005 review of the principles (before 
revisions) concluded that the majority of lenders provided only limited reporting of 
their implementation of the EPs.115 BankTrack also found some hesitancy among 
Equator banks to disclose the details (for example, names, locations, facilities) of 
projects that they had financed or declined.116 Most recently, in May 2007, 
BankTrack raised concerns about the growing role of Chinese banks in project 
lending and their failure to commit to responsible financing.117 On the other hand, a 
report by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer more optimistically suggested that the 
principles have led some Equator banks ‘into more structured dialogue with 
stakeholders and NGOs about social and environmental aspects of their lending.’118 
On enforceability, the EPs disclaim that they confer ‘any rights in, or liability to, any 
person.’ Thus, the Equator banks do not see the Principle 6 grievance mechanism as a 
formal dispute resolution system that can confer obligations or liabilities against them. 
Further, while borrowers must adhere to environmental covenants included in the loan 
agreement, lenders themselves are not contractually bound to comply with the EPs or to 
enforce them against their borrowers. Theoretically, shareholders of a publicly listed Equator 
bank might contend that they have relied on their bank’s public statements that it abides by the 
EPs. In some jurisdictions, this false communication would enable shareholder suits where 
the bank’s reputation (and, therefore, the business and shareholder value) has suffered because 
of a failure to implement the EPs.119 
Evidence so far suggests that implementation of the principles has been patchy. 
 Some projects appear to have been rejected for incompatibility with EP standards, 
while other sources point to Equator banks still funding unsustainable projects.120 The 
banks’ own corporate sustainability reports shed some insight. Barclays Bank, for 
example, discloses in its glossy Corporate Responsibility Report 2005 that it 
considered fifty highand medium-risk projects and declined twenty-two.121 Other 
factors besides environmental concerns have no doubt played a part here. HSBC 
boasts that in 2005 it rejected seven projects of sixty-seven that it reviewed for 
compliance with the EPs.122 
Several major, international infrastructure projects have tested the credibility of the EPs. 
One is the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline running through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and 
Turkey to bring Caspian Sea oil to the West.123 According to BankTrack, this project, which 
was funded by a consortium of financiers including some Equator banks, violates the EPs 
in regard to protection of indigenous peoples and ecologically sensitive terrain. However, 
the pipeline development consortium has in many respects applied the EPs openly. They 
created a publicly accessible website,124 where anyone can consult environmental assessments 
and related  documents, many of which are published in local languages. The BTC case 
shows that an Equator bank may be fully in conformity with decision-making procedures laid 
down by the principles yet, ultimately, still fund a development that many see as being 
unsustainable. 
Another controversial project testing the credibility of the EPs is the Uruguayan pulp 
mills proposed near the Rio Uruguay, bordering Uruguay and Argentina. The mills, which 
pose many environmental hazards, have engendered much dispute between the countries 
including litigation in the International Court of Justice.125  In November 2006 the IFC 
approved a $170 million investment in the Orion pulp mill, one of the two mills, the 
majority of which is owned by Finnish company Oy Metsä-Botnia Ab.126 IFC endorsement 
has made it easier to garner private lenders for the Uruguay pulp mills, although some 
Equator banks have declined.127 The NGO community and Argentina itself remain deeply 
 concerned. A report on Financing Pulp Mills by the Center for International Forestry 
Research, contends that the SEIA submitted by Oy Metsä-Botnia Ab ‘falls far short of what a 
proper assessment of the mill should consider.’128 It also faulted an assessment process that 
began after the projects were well advanced. 
Given the structure of project financing, it is perhaps unrealistic to expect the EPs to 
revolutionize lending practices. In developed country markets, major projects usually 
require an EIA to be prepared in order to obtain relevant approvals for undertaking the 
project. Consequently, the application of the EPs would not significantly increase 
compliance costs or burdens faced by project sponsors or borrowers except perhaps in 
subtle ways, such as the extent of public consultation. In emerging markets, which is the 
intended domain for the EPs, environmental assessments are often not routine, and, 
consequently, the principles may create additional compliance costs for lenders. Project 
financers, however, have other reasons to take notice of environmental issues, including 
reputational risks or financial hardship for borrowers repaying a pollution fine.129 Even when 
a bank has sufficient motivation, its potential leverage over a borrower can be limited 
because banks often do not get involved in a financing deal until after the basic project 
choices and design decisions have already been made.130 Further, determined would-be 
borrowers have ways to circumvent an Equator bank’s demands, such as by self-financing a 
project using shareholder funds or the bond market.131 This fact points to the need for more 
comprehensive solutions to promote SRI throughout financial markets rather than merely 
within the project finance context. 
2. Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
The GRI, which was launched by CERES and UNEP in 1997, is a multi-stakeholder 
process creating an internationally applicable framework for reporting on sustainability 
issues.132 The GRI furnishes reporting principles and specific indicators to guide 
sustainability reporting for companies and other organizations. GRI Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines (known as G-3, being the third generation of guidelines) were issued 
in 2006.133 They consist of reporting principles, reporting guidance, and standard 
 disclosures. The reporting principles are materiality, stakeholder inclusiveness, 
sustainability context, and completeness. 
Appreciating  the  limits  of  a  homogeneous  reporting  framework, the GRI 
has created sector-specific supplements. The financial sector supplement 
focuses on unique environmental impacts associated with financial services 
and products.134 Reporting standards use thirteen environmental performance 
indicators, such as ‘description of process[es] for assessing and screening 
environmental risks in core business lines’ and ‘description of voting policy on  
environmental  issues  for  shares over which the reporting organisation holds the 
right to vote shares or advise on voting.’135 The governance structure of the GRI 
has enabled a broad range of stakeholders to influence the reporting guidelines 
and is thus reflective of their concerns and objectives. The consensus-making 
approach increases the GRI’s legitimacy and applicability. On the other hand, the 
GRI is not a management tool. It guides non-financial reporting and must be 
complemented by a separate corporate environmental management system 
(EMS). 
The GRI has become the dominant standard for non-financial reporting. A 2005 
KMPG analysis of corporate reporting trends found changes in both the style and 
scale of environmental reports.136 First, the focus of reporting has evolved from 
mainly purely environmental reporting until the late 1990s to sustainability (social, 
environmental, and economic) reporting, reflective of changes to the GRI guidelines 
themselves. Second, on the scale of changes, KMPG found that sustainability 
reporting has become more mainstream among the majority of large companies 
surveyed.137 Of the respondents interviewed, 40 per cent noted that the GRI was 
determinative of the content of their company’s sustainability report.138 Other 
studies have verified the increasing status of the GRI guidelines.139 The SRI 
 community has sought to promote use of the GRI among financial institutions.140 
However, the quality of GRI reporting by some financial institutions has been 
disappointing. Many simply report on their direct, in-house activities rather than the 
broader environmental risks and impacts of their clients and borrowers.141 
 
1. ISO 14000 Series 
I V.  MANAGEM EN T SYST EMS 
Like reporting mechanisms, EMSs help financial institutions to assess their own or their 
clients’ environmental performance.142 An EMS is a group of standards and processes that 
organizations may adopt to improve their internal use of materials and energy and a 
structure for organizations to identify, appraise, and minimize their environmental risks. 
An EMS can help a business make production cost savings and gain a better market 
reputation.143 Several internationally applicable EMSs can aid SRI.144 The most important 
are the International Organisation for  Standardization (ISO) 14000 series145 and the EU’s 
Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS).146 
The ISO, which is an umbrella organization for a network of national standards 
institutes from over 1fi0 countries, has produced numerous technical standards to facilitate 
technology exchange and trade.147 Its first EMS was the ISO 14000 series, encompassing 
management system principles, environmental auditing, and life cycle assessment. There is 
no official ISO standard for the financial services sector as such. All of the ISO 14000 series 
take the form of ‘guidance,’ with the exception of the ISO 14001, which is a certificated 
standard.148 It requires participating organizations to develop an environmental policy 
statement; a corporate plan to achieve environmental goals and comply with legislation; 
and a monitoring system. The aim is a process by which businesses may reflexively learn to 
identify and eliminate environmentally damaging activities.149 Yet, while ISO compliance 
indicates the existence of management controls, it does not signify an absolute level of 
performance. 
The ISO has decided to develop a new voluntary standard on corporate social 
 responsibility that may prove particularly beneficial for SRI. The guidance standard 
will be published in 2008 as ISO 26000.150  It will not, however, include specific 
requirements and will thus not be a certification standard like the ISO 14001. The 
financial sector is taking a growing interest in ISO 14001 both for itself and its 
clients.151 Banks have been most interested, and, in 1999, the UBS (a Swiss bank) 
was the first lender to be certified.152 The Credit Suisse Group, which also has ISO 
14001 certification, has spoken of its advantages: ‘[B]eing certified improves the 
marketing of the green and ethical funds we offer to our institutional and retail 
customers.’153 In asset selection, Credit Suisse explains ‘it is much easier to select 
stocks of ISO 14001-certified companies for a green and/or ethical fund.’154 And it 
believes that ‘having a certified EMS speeds up risk assessment because all relevant 
environmental data is already available or quickly obtained.’155 
2. Eco-Management Audit Scheme (EMAS) 
The EMAS differs from ISO 14000 by seeking continuous performance improvements 
and public disclosure of environmental auditing findings.156 Participating organizations 
voluntarily agree to install an EMS (usually for discrete physical sites) and prepare 
performance reports for verification by a certified environmental auditor at least once every 
three years. Those that achieve the performance standards can market an approved emblem in 
their advertisements and promotions.157 The organizations must also formulate an 
environmental policy statement for verification by an independent auditor, which is also 
made available to the public. The EMAS is considered a good example of a reflexive 
environmental law since it encourages awareness raising and the disclosure of environmental 
impacts within industry.158 
The EMAS was amended in 2001 to broaden its scope to, inter alia, financial 
services.159 Previously, the EMAS was structured around discrete physical sites rather 
than organizations per se, such as the whole operations of a company. Before 2001, 
countries could only extend the EMAS provisions to the service sector on an 
 experimental basis,160 as Austria and Germany did so for banking and insurance 
industries.161 The new focus is on the organization itself not on its physical location. 
This change was crucial for the EMAS to encompass the financial sector. Further, 
under Annex VI of the EMAS, an organization can only be certified if it 
considers all environmental aspects of its activities, including ‘indirect 
environmental aspects’ arising from ‘capital investments, granting loans and 
insurance services.’162 This change is seminal because a financial organization’s 
direct ecological footprint (for example, its energy use and waste) is markedly 
lower than the impact of its borrowers and customers, which are much more 
pervasive. However, promotional material for the financial sector suggests that the 
EMAS remains targeted primarily at the direct ecological footprint of financiers’ 
activities, including consumers of resources such as paper and energy and 
extending to their supply chains.163 Financial institutions that are EMAS certified 
include UniCredito Italiano and Oesterreichische Nationalbank. 
3. Potential of the EMS 
By summarizing environmental performance data, EMSs can help financiers 
efficiently assess the risks posed by clients. Insurance markets were the first sector 
to acknowledge firms’ accreditation to EMSs.164 Significant discounts on 
environmental liability insurance premiums were offered to chemical 
manufacturers that subscribed to the Responsible Care EMS.165 Some banks offer 
finance on preferential terms to EMS-certified borrowers.166 Davies suggests: ‘[B]y 
looking for [EMS] registration in loan applications, banks can determine several facts 
relevant to the health of their loan portfolios.’167 Yet because EMSs tend to look at 
existing rather than future environmental performance, they must usually be 
supplemented with regular verification to retain their validity. 
While the propagation of corporate EMSs provides a welcome framework for reflexive 
 management and environmental self-organization, the approach has some limitations.168 From a 
regulatory perspective, EMSs may be unsatisfactory to the extent that they favour private over 
public interests.169 Nor can free-riding third parties be forced to comply given the voluntary 
nature of the process, unless governments legislate minimum environmental standards and 
offer inducements to companies. Furthermore, EMSs are essentially procedural, requiring 
that companies have a system for managing environmental issues. The substantive goals 
that a company selects as the basis of its EMS may be facile so that it can achieve the desired 
standards at little inconvenience.170 Greater involvement of environmental NGOs in the 
design of EMS standards may help make them more publicly acceptable and take firms beyond 
business as usual.171 
 
V. COM PA R AT I V E EVA LUAT ION MECH A N ISMS 
1. Sustainability Indexes 
A. Function and Structure of Sustainability Indexes 
Sustainability indexes are a relatively new SRI governance tool to assess and compare the 
social and environmental performance of public companies. A sustainability index is a special 
type of market index. A market index tracks price movements of listed financial securities 
within it. By comparing market values of selected companies over time, a graph can be 
constructed to show changes in their value. A sustainability index is distinctive as it only 
includes firms that meet specified environmental and social criteria, in addition to 
demonstrating financial robustness. Each index has its own criteria for inclusion and 
methods for collecting data on companies’ performance. Official stock exchanges and 
private SRI research institutions have both established sustainability indexes, as detailed in 
Table 2. 
The criteria and rules that govern inclusion in each index help to improve the 
integrity of the SRI market in three crucial ways. First, the methodologies to 
select and rank companies constitute a normative benchmark for the whole SRI 
market including companies not formally included in any index. Second, they 
 provide sustainability benchmarks against which to compare performance. 
Responsible investors may rely on such indexes, as both a benchmark to compare 
the progress of their SRI portfolio to the sustainability index and as a means of 
picking assets that comply with the investor’s preferred environmental and social 
criteria. Third, the ultimate membership selections of the SRI indexes constitute an 
instrument of market ordering. Companies that seek competitive advantages from 
association with a prestigious sustainability index are disciplined to adhere to the 
index criteria of membership. Each index helps communicate the standards of social 
investors to corporations in an understandable format. Together, these 
characteristics make sustainability market indexes a unique enforcement mechanism 
for corporate governance standards since removal of a company from an index 
focuses the attention of owners as well as management in a way that bad publicity 
or condemnation by an institutional investor is unlikely to accomplish alone. 
  
Each sustainability index only includes companies sourced from a specific investment 
universe, such as European or US equities. Most indexes also cap the number of 
constituents, so if one company is excluded it is replaced immediately with another. The 
Dow Jones specialist SRI indexes have between 100 and 2fi0 companies each.172 Companies, 
 of course, must have publicly traded stocks to be eligible for inclusion in an index. This 
mandate excludes some socially responsible companies that are not public firms (for 
example, Ikea). 
The following sections look in detail at the two main sustainability indexes—the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Group Indexes and the Financial Times Stock Exchange 
(FTSE)4Good  Index  Series.  These  indexes  are the most significant since their 
connections to major international stock exchanges in New York and London have given 
each a profile and level of market influence unobtainable by rival SRI indexes. Both 
indexes now include many financial institutions, mainly banks and investment firms that 
take the form of public corporations.173 They also have set benchmarks for some other 
SRI indexes such as Australia’s Sustainable Assessment Management (SAM) 
Sustainability Index.174 
 
B. Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes (DJSIs) 
The DJSIs were launched in 1999 to track the financial performance of the 
leading CSR-driven companies worldwide.175 The first index created in this 
family, the Dow Jones Sustainability World Index, comprises over 300 companies 
that represent, using Dow Jones criteria, the top 10 per cent of the leading 
sustainability companies drawn from the Dow Jones Global Indexes. Other indexes 
added to the family include the Dow Jones Sustainability North American Index, the 
Dow Jones Sustainability United States Index, and the Dow Jones Sustainability 
European Index.176 
All indexes of the DJSI family are constructed according to the same CSR criteria, which 
include general and industry-specific criteria, covering three areas: environmental, 
economic, and social performance.177 The Swiss-based SAM makes the evaluations. Using 
a business case model of CSR, the SAM looks at how corporate sustainability 
performance creates both financial risks and opportunities. It thus provides a ‘financial 
 quantification of corporate sustainability performance.’178 
The general SAM assessment criteria include corporate governance, environmental 
management and performance, human rights, supply chain management, and labour 
practices. This information is assimilated and verified to give each company an overall 
‘corporate sustainability score.’ This score enables identification of leading sustainability 
companies in each sector. Negative screens are also applied to the DJSI World to create 
subset indexes that exclude companies involved in the production of tobacco, alcohol, 
gambling, armaments, and firearms. 
Information about corporate social, economic, and environmental performance is 
gathered from disparate sources including general industry questionnaires, corporate 
documents and reports, media commentary and stakeholder reports, and direct contacts 
with companies.179 While the criteria and methodology behind the index is publicly 
available, the data collected by SAM analysts for determining the composition of each 
DJSI is not disclosed publicly. Independent studies, though, have found that DJSI World 
companies perform strongly on CSR indicators.180 
To maintain the integrity of each index, a ‘corporate sustainability monitoring’ 
system applies ‘to verify a company’s involvement and management of critical 
environmental, economic and social crisis situations that can have a highly 
damaging effect on its reputation.’181 The monitoring system can lead to a firm’s 
exclusion from the DJSI. Further, each DJSI is reviewed annually and quarterly to 
ensure that the index composition accurately reflects the top tier of leading 
sustainability companies within the DJSI investable universe.182 
 
The Design and Advisory Committees are critical to the DJSI governance. The former 
comprises two representatives from each of the DGSI and the SAM Group. This committee is 
responsible for auditing the index composition at annual and quarterly reviews, completing an 
ongoing review of all extraordinary corporate actions for possible changes to index 
 composition, verifying the integrity of market data, and, ultimately, deciding on the 
composition of the index. The DJSI Advisory Committee has ten independent financial 
sector advisors and CSR experts. Its primary mandate is ‘to give advice on possible 
implications for sustainability-driven portfolio management and offer input regarding the 
methodology.’183 
 
C. FTSE4Good Index Series 
The FTSE4Good Index Series was launched in July 2001 with the intention of raising funds 
for UNICEF by donating licensing fees from the index to support UNICEF programmes for 
children. By 2007 the FTSE4Good had grown to a family of five indexes covering global 
and major regional markets.184 They function under the auspices of the FTSE, which is 
based in London. The FTSE4Good indexes are derived from the parent FTSE All-Share 
Index (United Kingdom) or the FTSE Developed Index (Global). Unlike the DJSI, the 
FTSE4Good indexes are not about recognizing ‘best practice’ companies. Rather, they set 
specific standards for companies to meet if they wish to be included in the index. The 
FTSE4Good also differs from the DJSI in that it has a policy of active engagement and 
dialogue with companies. It is much more proactive than other SRI index providers in 
pushing companies to improve their sustainability performance.185 
The FTSE4Good uses a mix of positive and negative screens, and the criteria are 
progressively tightened over time, such as new climate change standards.186 Screens 
include companies that satisfy requirements in five areas: the environment, climate 
change, human rights, supply chain labour standards, and countering bribery. 
Conversely, companies connected to tobacco, nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, or 
uranium mining are excluded. The FTSE4Good Policy Committee intends to 
eventually replace these exclusion criteria with performance-based criteria. 
The FTSE4Good team has devised detailed criteria to define three dimensions of 
sustainability.187 Environmental criteria assign companies with a low, medium, or high 
 impact weighting according to their industry sector. Higher impact sectors incur more 
stringent index inclusion criteria. These criteria cover corporate environmental policy, 
management systems, and reporting practices. For example, while a company in a high 
impact sector must adopt a formal EMS, a company in a low impact sector need not.188 
Further, high impact companies must regularly publish a report on their environmental 
policies and practices, unlike lower impact sector companies. 
Like the DJSI, the FTSE4Good retains an SRI consultancy group, the Ethical 
Investment Research Service (EIRIS), to assess companies according to the FTSE4Good 
criteria. EIRIS relies on company questionnaires, direct contact, and company reports for 
its evaluations. A specialist FTSE committee retains ultimate responsibility for decisions to 
include or remove a company from the indexes. The FTSE4Good Policy Committee, whose 
membership is drawn from corporations, academia, NGOs, and the financial sector, reviews 
the FTSE4Good indexes semi-annually. It also oversees the development and approval of 
criteria revisions or new criteria to the indexes. 
The FTSE4Good indexes are influential because they are used as a basis for regional and 
global SRI index tracker funds and for asset selection by actively managed investment 
portfolios. According to the FTSE, its SRI indexes help ‘investors to navigate through the 
plethora of corporate social responsibility (CSR) codes and standards around the world.’189 A 
2004 study of the FTSE4Good’s impact on corporate behaviour suggests that it has had some 
impact on the internal operations of listed companies, especially on their reporting, policy 
decisions, and management systems.190 
2. SRI Research and Advocacy Bodies 
A significant facet of the new transnational governance of SRI is the global network of 
SRI think tanks, namely research, consultancy, and advocacy bodies. This plethora of 
financial sector and civil society institutions, which are detailed in Table 3, contribute to 
sharing information, raising awareness, building consensus for action, disseminating best 
practice examples, and encouraging policy advocacy. They assist governance through the 
evaluation and ranking of corporate social and environmental performance, surveys of SRI 
 market trends, and the facilitation of information about the SRI sector generally through 
conferences, websites, and reports.The most valuable governance function formed by these 
institutions is the evaluation and rating of corporate social and environmental performance 
for investors. This work contributes to SRI norm building in several ways. The process by 
which companies collect and respond to questionnaires, surveys, and other information 
requests may help them to reflect upon their social and environmental performance, 
possibly with a view to making organizational and policy changes.191 Some of these SRI 
research institutions have lobbied and pressured governments for reforms. For instance, 
Canada’s Social Investment Organization has campaigned for amendments to Canadian 
pensions fund legislation in order to require disclosure of SRI policies.192 The SRI research 
and advocacy community has also critically influenced important governance questions, 
such as what should qualify as SRI. Table 3 lists some principal SRI associations. 
  
 
Monitoring the financiers’ observance of SRI standards and  exerting pressure for 
 improved compliance is another function played by these bodies and other NGOs. 
Broad-based environmental NGOs are increasingly scrutinizing the environmental 
impacts of financiers.193 Some specialize in just the financial sector, such as 
BankTrack,194 which monitors compliance with the Equator Principles. Apart from 
these civil societal institutions, market players such as associations of institutional 
investors have also collaborated to address SRI issues. These include the 
Canadian Coalition of Good Governance,195 the Council of Institutional 
Investors,196 and the International Corporate Governance Network.197 Several investor  
coalitions have formed subsidiary groups targeting specific SRI concerns. To 
address climate change risk, for example, investors have set up the Carbon 
Disclosure Project,198 which gathers information necessary for investors to assess 
the financial risks posed by climate change; the Institutional Investor Summits on 
Climate Risk,199 which provides investors with a comprehensive analysis of the 
financial risks associated with climate change; the Institutional Investors Group on 
Climate Change,200 which exchanges information about the material risks to, and 
opportunities for, businesses associated with climate change; and the Investor 
Network on Climate Risk, which addresses financial risk implications.201 
Another facet is the specialist consultancy organizations, which provide SRI advice and 
research to investors. These include Mercer Management Consulting,202 Innovest,203 
Enhanced Analytics Initiative,204 and KLD Research and Analytics.205 They evaluate 
corporate environmental performance, research the state of the SRI market, and provide 
management tools to investors wishing to integrate environmental, social, and governance 
factors into their financial decisions. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The preceding commentary highlights that different governance mechanisms play 
different roles. These include providing normative frameworks, process standards, 
 management systems, and comparative evaluation. Normative frameworks furnish 
guidance on best practices and acceptable performance. Process guidelines enable 
an organization’s performance to be 
assessed, verified, and communicated. Management systems guide the integration of corporate 
codes of conduct in strategic and day-to-day corporate management. Comparative evaluation 
mechanisms serve to evaluate and rank businesses collectively to assist asset selection by 
SRI institutions. 
Are the fragmented norms and institutions of the current smorgasbord of transnational 
governance the most effective way to achieve a more sustainable society through the 
financial sector? Or do they merely tinker with the problem of irresponsible financing and 
thereby mask the continuation of business as usual? Certainly, the answer to these 
questions depends partly on available alternatives. Despite international agreements to 
liberalize financial services, governments retain ample authority to regulate at a national 
and international level the environmental impacts of investment. For instance, the General 
Agreement on Trade and Services in regard to financial services includes a so-called 
‘prudential carve-out,’ which allows states to enact public interest regulation to control 
unwelcome side effects of financial markets.206 However, governments have declined to use 
the prudential carve-out power to address environmental and social problems. Nor have they 
been willing to collaborate to enact international financial agreements that would impose 
substantive standards for ethical and responsible financing. This lacuna in hard law—in 
both the national and international spheres—has thus been left to soft law standards to fill. 
With any voluntary governance mechanism, the recurrent criticism is that they amount to 
‘greenwash’—a smokescreen to placate critics and enable companies to continue largely as 
usual.207 Given the context of a neo-liberal capitalist system, some NGOs and commentators 
see the Equator Principles and other SRI governance mechanisms as being incapable of 
achieving sustainability.208 In this perspective, SRI remains a niche market functioning 
within a financial sector that is unwilling to address social and environmental constraints and a 
system of regulation that does not favour social control over capital allocation. 
 Thus, perhaps SRI can only promote meaningful change if it is nested within a 
governance system that includes more rigorous controls such as mandatory 
corporate sustainability reporting, fully cost-internalizing environmental taxes and 
liability rules, the democratization of financial institution governance, and greater 
state involvement in capital allocation such as through national pension plans, which 
is starting to occur in Sweden and New Zealand.209 Given the complexity and 
intrusiveness of such measures, they would most likely be adopted through national-
level regulation rather than through international agreements, at present. 
As the emerging SRI governance mechanisms are prone to subversion by the very market 
forces that they are meant to govern, how can we maintain their integrity? One reason for 
hope is that the very fragmented and disparate nature of these mechanisms, which span 
numerous codes of conduct, indexes, reporting standards, and research associations, may 
help minimize the risk of the entire realm being colonized or co-opted. The global network of 
environmental and social NGOs will also play a role in keeping pressure on the financial 
sector. 
The behavioural impact of SRI transnational governance mechanisms lacks thorough 
empirical verification. This article has suggested changes in policies and behaviour of 
financial institutions. Many banks and investors have subscribed to codes of conduct, issued 
policy statements, established new organizational units, and changed their environmental risk 
assessment procedures. However, the impact of these changing SRI norms on the companies 
that they finance is much harder to determine. Given the difficulty of isolating the impact 
of specific variables, it is only possible to draw contingent and provisional conclusions 
about the impact of changes in SRI governance. 
It is clear that, although SRI governance has global ambitions, the financial institutions that 
have thus far committed themselves to SRI standards are overwhelmingly from Western 
Europe and, to a lesser extent, from North America and Oceania. These are regions 
characterized by relatively high levels of political and civil rights, mature markets, and active 
 civil society organizations. Conversely, countries without these conditions remove a major 
impetus for adopting a code of conduct. Thus, corporate policies and strategies are more 
likely to address environmental issues when demanded or induced by the institutional 
context of a particular company. Corporate adherences to SRI codes serve what some 
commentators have described as part of their ‘social license’ to operate.210 
Another key observation is that financial institutions specializing in those services or 
functions with the most visibility, and with the greatest involvement in the design of a 
code, are most likely to adopt it. To illustrate, among the top twenty international 
arrangers of project finance loans, 60 per cent have signed the EPs. The EPs were 
developed by the banking industry, and this fact has created advantages in having 
the principles designed by people knowledgeable about project finance and the sense 
of ownership that the banking industry felt about the process. The corresponding 
numbers for other services or functions of lower public visibility (or those that have 
environmental and social impacts that are less directly traceable) are global fund 
managers (3fi per cent) and global financial advisers (30 per cent).211 Reputational 
risk appears to drive an adherence to SRI norms. 
If we accept that only voluntary standards and codes are likely to be tolerated by 
financial markets and international policy makers in the near future, what improvements to 
them can we realistically expect? Three areas of reform need investigation. First, should the 
plethora of standards be harmonized into one or two main governance frameworks? The 
complexity and institutional diversity of financial markets, where financiers pursue different 
roles, are one reason to favour the continued evolution of sector and function-specific 
governance mechanisms. And, as noted earlier, the diversity of standards also protects 
against subversion by hostile market forces. On the other hand, some consolidation of 
governance tools could decrease confusion as well as the implementation costs for 
organizations. 
A second topic for reform is to bolster the enforcement side of these voluntary 
 mechanisms. Market institutions such as stock exchanges  could be harnessed as 
surrogate regulators. For instance, we could go beyond sustainability indexes to 
require that each company meet environmental standards as a condition of being 
listed on a stock. For codes of conduct such as the Equator Principles and the UN 
statements, we must expand the role of the public in monitoring and enforcing 
these norms. Financiers should be accountable not only to their shareholders and 
other supporters but also to the communities whose livelihoods are affected by the 
projects they finance. Creating mechanisms for community accountability such as 
the World Bank Inspection Panel or the IFC’s Office of the Compliance 
Advisor/Ombudsman should be a priority for the SRI codes.212 A useful feature of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises is the system of ‘national contact points’ in the 
participating countries to hear complaints from the public concerning company 
non-compliance with the guidelines.213 While this mechanism has not always 
brought justice, such as the recent case involving a complaint against Australia’s 
ANZ bank financing forestry operations in Papua New Guinea, it has the potential 
to do more.214 
Third, SRI governance tools are primarily informational policy instruments. They serve 
to communicate, evaluate, and rank corporate environmental performance for interested 
responsible investors. Not only does such information feed the ethical concerns of investors, 
but it may also affect the market value of businesses by disclosing liabilities and other 
factors that affect earnings and profitability.215 However, it would be useful to see some 
direct financial incentives offered to stimulate SRI. For example, governments could offer 
tax concessions to SRI organizations, which would be carried out in the context of 
approved SRI codes of conduct. 
This article thus gives cautious and highly qualified endorsement to the new transnational 
 SRI governance. Lamentably, it falls short of what is needed to truly reorient capital 
markets towards social justice and environmental protection. Yet the limitations of alternate 
routes to international environmental regulation must be acknowledged. It has been 
governments’ inability or unwillingness  to  regulate  financial  institutions  and  corporate 
conduct effectively that has prompted civil society and some responsible investors to take 
the lead. When governments fail to agree to regulate international financial markets, the 
advantages of the current potpourri of instruments become even more apparent. They help 
to overcome the shortcomings of global politics where agreement on inter-governmental 
policies and regulations can take years to happen, if at all. However, we should not be 
resigned to accepting this situation as the best we can achieve. The environmental crisis 
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